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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction for the above captioned matter is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2A-3 (2)(c).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Was the defendant prejudiced?

2.

Has defendant demonstrated that counsel? s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable and
professional j udgment?

- iii -

CECELIA M. ESPENOZA, #3790,
Assistant City Prosecutor,
451 South 200 East, #125,
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

vs.

:

FAROUK MEHIO,
Defendant,Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

CRIMINAL NO.860076464
APPELLATE # 880459-CA
Classification: PRIORITY 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This in a

appeal from a judgement against Farouk Mehio for

the offense of Resisting the Lawful Arrest of an officer, A Class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Section 32-1-5, Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City.

A jury found Mr. Mehio guilty of Resisting

the Lawful Arrest of an officer at the end of a one day trial
held on January 19, 1988.(R. 56).
Judge Sheila McCleve sentenced Mr. Mehio on February 29,
1988, to six months suspended jail on the following conditions:
1.

No further contact with the victim.(R.60-63)

2.

Completion of 5 days community service.

3.

Payment of $625.00 fine.

4.

Six month probation with A P & P.
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FACTS

The facts when viewed in the light most favorable to
upholding the jury verdict demonstrate:
1.

The defendant, Farouk Mehio, was charged with Resisting

the Lawful Arrest of an officer by an amended information filed
January 19, 1988, before the Honorable Sheila McCleve. (R. 21)
2.

The defendant appeared for a jury trial scheduled

January 19, 1988, with his counsel, James Hawkes.
trial, Mr. Hawkes made a Motion in Limine.

Prior to

Said motion was to

limit the information and access of a prior conviction against
the defendant for the crime of reckless driving. (Tr. 4-5)
Reckless driving being the predicate offense to this incident.
(Tr. 4) Counsel also requested that prior convictions of
defendant not be introduced at trial.

Both motions were granted,

whereupon a jury was impaneled.(Tr. 5 ) .
3.

During the course of voir dire, the court specifically

inquired into prejudice for or against the testimony of a police
officer. (Tr. 18, 19)
4.

Defendant's theory of the case as presented at the trial

was twofold.

First, Defendant attempted to impeach the

credibility and veracity of Carol Jensen.(Tr. 59 - 64), and
second, defendant attempted to assert unlawful force by the
officer against him.

(Tr. 6 7 - 7 4 and 140 - 144).

Both of the contentions of the defendant were rejected by
the jury and the defendant was convicted.
- 2 -

5.

During the trial, two witnesses were called by the

Plaintiff.

The first was the complainant, Carol Jensen.

In the

course of her testimony Ms. Jensen admitted to a prior
relationship with the Defendant. (Tr. 37, 59)

She also indicated

that on the date in question, Defendant and she were not seeing
each other.

(Tr. 38)

Ms. Jensen testified that upon Mr. Mehio ? s

arrival at her apartment, he was placed under arrest by Trooper
Graber.

Ms. Jensen testified that Mr. Mehio failed to comply

with Trooper GraberTs request to put his hands behind his back in
order to be handcuffed.

(Tr. 54)

She also indicated that once

Mr. Mehio was under control and placed on the ground, he was
"thrashing about" and "flailing his legs in the air". (Tr. 56)
She described the carpet where Mr. Mehio was controlled as
"indoor-outdoor". (Tr. 55)

Finally, Ms. Jensen testified that

she told Trooper Graber that Mr. Mehio had a black belt in
Karate.(Tr. 66)
6.

Trooper Graber was then called to stand on behalf of the

Plaintiff.

He testified that he had been employed by the Utah

Highway Patrol for eleven years.

He responded to Ms. Jensen's

home to complete a police report and while he was obtaining the
information necessary to complete his police report, Mr. Mehio
arrived at Ms. Jensen's doorstep.

Trooper Graber "heard a loud

banging and yelling at the doorway". (Tr. 86)

Trooper Graber

then got between Ms. Jensen and Mr. Mehio and placed him under
arrest. (Tr. 88)

The defendant refused to cooperate and pulled

away from Trooper Graber. (Tr. 88)

An altercation ensued during

which time Mr. Mehio was taken from Ms. Jensen's apartment and
- 3 -

placed in the hallway flat on his stomach.

According to Trooper

Graber's testimony he continued "thrashing around on the floor,
yelling, screaming, banging his head, kicking his feet". (Tr.
94).

Trooper Graber indicated that Mr. Mehio refused to comply

with his order and attempted to break free from the arrest on two
occasions.
7.

(Tr. 90) The Plaintiff rested (Tr.116).

In a unique trial move, defense counsel then attempted

to call Assistant Attorney General Ed Olgilve, the civil attorney
representing Trooper Graber. (Tr.118-125)

The court determined

that Ms. Jensen's credibility could not be impeached through Mr.
Olgilve, and denied counsel's request. (Tr 125)
8.

Recognizing defendant's language barrier all leeway was

given to him in his testimony.

In his testimony he alleged that

the officer used excessive force against him. (Tr. 136) He was
allowed to introduce photographs of himself taken approximately
one week to ten days after the incident. (Tr. 138)

During the

course of his examination he was specifically asked by his
counsel "Do you have trouble with English?"
I just want to explain when I said that

His answer was "No.

why;"

(Tr. 145)Finally,

in his testimony, he was allowed to describe his medical
treatment. (Tr. 144-145)
9.

Cross examination of the defendant by the plaintiff's

attorney revealed that Defendant did in fact understand the
questions being put to him.

At times, he did not want to be

responsive, but he appeared to understand the questions.,
149 - 158).
- 4 -

(Tr.

Cross-examination also revealed prior treatments for medical
injuries similar to those the defendant alleges on this incident,
(Tr. 156 - 157) and defendant admitted the he previously hit
Carol Jensen. (Tr. 158)
10.

The case was submitted to the jury who returned a

GUILTY verdict (Tr. 56)
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ARGUMENT

POINT I:

DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS
BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL

In State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2nd 270 (Ut.App.1987), this
court articulated the standards of the Utah Supreme Court
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.

Relying upon the

case of Strickland vs. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984), the Utah
Supreme Court established a standard for determining claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in State v. Frame, 728
P.2d 401 (Utah 1986).

To prevail, the defendant must demonstrate

First:
that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant.
As in Pursifell, in this case the defendant's claims maybe
adjudicated relying on the second prong of the Strickland test.
In Pursifell, the court stated:
We need not decide whether counself s performance was
deficient if defendant failed to satisfy his burden of
showing that he was prejudiced as a result of the
alleged deficiencies. Id. at 275.
The object of ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsel's performance if it is easier to dispose them
then ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice,... that course should be
followed.' State vs. Pursifell, at 275, citing
Strickland vs. Washington.
Defendant raises five allegations to demonstrate ineffective
counsel.
1.

That he was not adequately prepared as a witness.
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2.

That Trooper Christensen should have been called as a
witness .

3.

That Carol Jensen was not sufficiently impeached.

4.

That medical information was not provided to the jury.

5.

That counsel failed to delve into the reckless driving
incident.

None of these allegations give rise to a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's error, the result would have
been different."

State vs. Frame, at 405.

A reasonable

probability is defined as "that sufficient to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the verdict" Id. see also State
v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985).
Defendant? s first allegation of error is inadequate
preparation for trial.

However, the excerpts cited by defendant

do not support that contention.

In fact, they support the fact

the Mr. Mehio, despite advice from counsel, was attempting to
provide to the jury information that might not otherwise be
available to them.

Each of the outbursts quoted in defendant's

brief page 6 and 7 convey to the jury the defendant's version of
the truth.
The difficulty defense counsel was having controlling his
client is demonstrated by the frustration of counsel's response
to the courts inquiry of a recess.

In the course of the trial,

the judge asked: "Do you need to talk to him? Do you need a
recess?"

Mr. Hawkes response was: "Oh, I don't know if it will

help, your Honor, if (sic) might."
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(Tr. 143)

The defendant was then instructed to listen to and answer
the questions.

He stated he would do so.

At this point, his

attorney asked if he was having trouble with English and he
stated "No."

(Tr. 143). Taken as a whole, there is no

indication that the jury was unable to understand or weigh the
testimony of Mr. Mehio.
The defendant's second allegation, that Trooper Christensen
was not called to the stand similarly fails to give rise to a
"reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different."

The deposition filed as defendant's

appendix B indicates that Trooper Graber did not arrive on the
scene until the defendant, Mehio, had been taken to the ground
and handcuffed.

Therefore, his actual knowledge of the

interaction between the defendant and Trooper Graber which was
the basis of the charge, was non existent.

The jury was

presented a version of facts of resisting arrest which occurred
prior to the time that Trooper Christensen arrived.

Therefore,

there could be no reasonable probability of a different result
had Trooper Christensen been called. Additionally, Trooper
Christensen's deposition indicates that Mr. Mehio was acting in a
hostile and angry manner towards Trooper Graber. (Deposition page
7)

It is quite probable that the defense attorney recognized

this and made a conscious determination not to call Trooper
Christensen and thus avoid painting the defendant as the
aggressor in this situation.
In Codianna vs. Morris, 660 P.2nd 1101 at 1110 (Utah 1983)
the Utah Supreme Court determined that it would "not second guess
- 8 -

trial counsels legitimate use of judgment".

For this reason,

Defendant's second allegation of error fails to demonstrate
ineffective counsel.
The third point raised by defendant is defense counsel' s
failure to impeach Carol Jensen.

As noted in the facts, defense

counsel attempted to do so by calling Assistant Attorney General
Ed Olgilvie.
(Tr.125).

The court ruled those attempts inadmissible.

Notwithstanding this, the defendant did in fact cross

examine Ms. Jensen extensively.

(Tr. 59-70;81-83).

During this

cross examination he attempted to show the bias which may have
existed on behalf of Ms. Jensen.

He also attempted to impeach

her statements regarding Karate. (Tr. 66,67,69,81)

Thus counsel

did in fact adequately represent his client and there is no
indication that a "reasonable probability exists that but for the
alleged error the result would have been different."
In State v. Royball, supra

citing State v. Howell, Utah,

649 P.2nd 91, 97 (1982), the court stated:
The jurys determination was supported by competent
evidence in the record and we must therefore sustain
it. The mere fact that contradictory evidence existed
does not justify reversal.
The fourth allegation is that defense counsel failed to
present medical evidence as to defendants injury.

This is a

trial decision based on the cost effectiveness of bringing in a
medical expert.

The information presented in appendix D of

defendant's brief would not have been admissible at trial.
Therefore the allegation of error is totally without merit and
supported on appeal.
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Additionally, defense counsel did inquire as to the injuries
suffered by the defendant.
the defendant's injuries.

He presented pictures to the jury of
(Transcript 144 to 146)

In laying

foundation for the introduction of this information in direct
examination, defendant's trial counsel was aware that he opened
the door for cross examination.

Defense counsel had b€>en

informed by the plaintiff that information of prior treatment for
similar injuries had been obtained by the plaintiff and would be
used to impeach the defendant's account of the injuries.

Thus,

once the defendant testified about the injuries, he was subject
to cross examination which did occur. (Transcript 156 - 157)
Finally, the defendant alleges on appeal that counsel should
have inquired further into the reckless driving.

This ignores

the fact that defendant had been convicted of reckless driving.
(See Appendix A)

In light of the prior conviction, defendant's

trial counsel made a pretrial motion in limine to minimize the
prejudicial effect of the reckless driving on the defendant.
(Tr. 4-5).
This was a legitimate tactic of a seasoned trial attorney
attempting to protect his client.

Defense counsel must take

their clients as they find them and protect their interests to
the best of their ability.

In this case, Defendant's counsel,

Jim Hawkes, attempted to do just that.

Contrary to Defendant's

claims on appeal, opening the door to the prior conviction would
have prejudiced the defendant not assisted his cause.
In each of the alleged areas of deficiency, defense counsel
acted in the best interest of his client.
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None of the alleged

areas give rise to any prejudice mandating a different result in
the case.

Therefore, the defendant has failed to meet his burden

of proof regarding prejudice and, his claim of the ineffective
assistance of counsel should be denied,

POINT II:

DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT ACT
IN A DEFICIENT MANNER.

The first prong of the test enunciated in Pursifell is
"whether counsel's performance was deficient".

In State v.

Frame, 723 P.2nd at 405 the Court acknowledged that the
defendant's complaint would have to be sufficient to "overcome
the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance
and exercised reasonable professional judgement"

The defendant's

contention that he had been abused and was therefore the victim
not aggressor was fully presented by defense counsel.

In State

v. Buel, 700 P.2nd 701 (Utah 1985) citing State v. Watts, Utah
675 P.2nd 566, 568 (1983) the court stated "the fact that there
was contradictory testimony, without more, is not grounds for
reversal."
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to justify the
verdict of the jury.

The jury as the triers of fact observed and

weighed the credibility of each of the witnesses.

The simple

rejection of defendant's claim is not sufficient to support an
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.
As demonstrated in Point I, there was no error that even
gave rise to prejudice.

An examination of the total record

demonstrates that, despite a difficult client, the theory of
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Defendant's case was fully presented to the jury.

The nuances

alleged by the Defendant on appeal should not replace the
decision of the fact finder who fully heard this case.
Therefore, the verdict should be upheld.

CONCLUSION

Based upon defendant's failure to enunciate, let alone meet
the standards required to sustain a reversal based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, the plaintiff requests that this court
reject the appeal and affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted this

day of

'<Msfi-e*L—,

,

1988.

CECELIA M. 'ESPEN02

Attorney for

-
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Plaintiff/Respondent
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